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A monthly column (of sorts)
Alison Cooley
ALONGSIDE





Data has a subjective dimension—or, perhaps more 
accurately, many subjective dimensions that feed 
into the way it’s generated, circulated, and inter-
preted. In this issue of GOOD MeASURe, we ob-
serve the production of the subject by data, which 
codiies the body to become a legible sign within the 
system. This coding of the body exceeds any partic-
ular politic, but often manifests as race, gender, and 
other inherently discriminatory categorizations of 
individuals. Undoubtedly, the tendency to process 
bodily information in an efort to draw certain over-
arching conclusions about a population, society, or 
culture-at-large has material consequences for the 
individuals that fall within the purview of those con-
clusions. No mater the function of the unmarked, 
one can argue that there may be no alternative. 
Although global, systemic infrastructure works to 
reinforce the authority of biodata, which then rein-
forces the distinctions that make data legible (from 
an anthropological perspective), the use of data to 
control bodies comes with blind spots. The irony 
of the intensely personal resonances of supposed-
ly objective or impartial information has not been 
lost on the contributors in this issue, who look at 
three examples of artists disrupting the program: In 
one instance, the body becomes institutionalized in 
the form of an art object, not only determining what 
speciic types of bodies are accepted by speciic in-
stitutions, but also looking diferently at processes 
of accumulation, collection, and preservation. The 
marginalized body gets reduced to trace, both refus-
ing its marked-ness while maintaining a speciicity—
namely, the speciicity of the individual. From an al-
ternate but not necessarily opposing perspective, the 
presumed singularity of the subjective body (rather 
than the body that feeds the anthropological corpus) 
falls under close scrutiny. Really—you’ll need a clos-
er look. Part of data’s authoritative guise comes from 
the assumption that, in the scientiic sphere, fact 
reigns over iction. But what happens when this dy-
namic is reversed? Or when fact and iction become 
indistinguishable? Yet again, the supposed objectivi-
ty of biodata and its applications softens like the tis-
sue it touts. 
The implementations of data, and biodata especially, 
are not always pointing to a top-down operation. 
We engage in acts of self-policing, or policing others, 
demanding a certain compliance with the hegemonic 
(and yes, top-down) inluence. In the inal article of 
this issue, part of KAPSULA’s recently launched col-
umn Alongside Interpretation, the politics of biodata 
begets a discussion about when the interpretive act 
collides with the act of surveillance. Manipulation 
does not always come packaged and labelled as itself, 
as a sell; sometimes, we don’t know what hit us until 
we’re outside the looking glass. If we’re to learn any 
particular lesson from these perspectives on GOOD 
MeASURe, it is this: the state of something unseen 
is not the same as something invisible—and this del-
icate suppression depends on the integrity of face, the 
everchanging surface onto which information maps 
itself. 
Adrian Piper’s What Will Become of Me consists of twelve 
honey jars illed with hair, arranged in a row on a wooden 
shelf .  Moving left to right, the hair in the irst three 
or four jars is black, while the rest contain increasing 
quantities of grey hair. Adjacent are two smaller jars, 
one holding yellowed slivers of ingernails and the other 
lecks of dried skin. Two framed, typewriten documents 
give context to the presentation of these bodily artifacts. 
On the left, a signed statement from Piper describes a se-
ries of hardships she experienced in 1985—the year she 
initiated the work. Her marriage started falling apart in 
January. Her father passed away from cancer in April. 
In December, Piper was denied tenure at the University 
of Michigan, where she had been appointed an assistant 
professor of philosophy. Concluding the statement, 
Piper writes, “I felt sure that if I could just hold myself 
together long enough to escape from Ann Arbor, I’d be 
all right.” 
The second document, titled “Statement of Intent,” is 
dated and signed September 20, 1989, four years after the 
start of the work. Brief and declarative, it reads: “The i-
nal form of this piece will comprise the statement, ‘What 
Will Become of Me,’ together with honey jars storing my 
hair, nails, and skin collected from 1 December 1985 to 
my death, plus my cremated ashes. I intend to donate 
this work to the Museum of Modern Art.” The botom 
left of the document bears the seal of a Maryland no-
tary, making the work a potentially legally binding 
agreement between Adrian Piper and its now owner, 
the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA).
The incomplete nature of the artwork begs a question: 
Will Piper really go through with this? The fact that she 
has continued to add items for the past thirty years indi-
cates that she might. Photographs taken between 1993 
and present day register the passage of time through 
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the accumulation of jars, and the change in hair color 
noted above. If the artist does send her ashes to MoMA, 
the institution will face new questions that have pre-
viously been the purview of archeologists and others 
more accustomed to navigating the ethical sensitivities 
of storing and displaying human remains. The museum 
will have to negotiate two responsibilities: one to show 
respect to Piper’s memory in its curatorial, educational 
and art handling practices, and the other to care for her 
remains as an object, applying to them the same admin-
istrative procedures used to manage the rest of its col-
lection . Chillingly, Piper’s remains may be assigned 
an alphanumeric accession number, and a description 
of them will be added to the medium line on wall labels 
and object reports. If accepted as part of the artwork, 
Piper’s ashes may at some point be stored on a shelf or 
in a vault.
Rather than dwelling on these hypothetical and mu-
seological questions, the present study concerns the 
interpretive issues raised by What Will Become of Me. In 
its completed form, how would such a work function 
in the galleries of MoMA: as a memorial, an oddity, or 
a singular work of art by a respected igure? Would 
someone critiquing its status or quality as art be imme-
diately accused of disrespect? What Will Become of Me is 
an example of a “di cult” artwork as described by Jen-
nifer Doyle in her book Hold it Against Me (Doyle 2013). 
Doyle deines di cult works as those that create dense 
ields of afect for the viewer (experiences of ambivalent, 
emotional intensity), as well as what she calls “contra-
dictory efects” that make interpretation challenging—
often as a result of the work’s engagement with identity 
and controversy (Doyle 2013, x). Doyle does not aim to 
resolve or overcome the di culty of her subjects, but 
rather to recognize the signiicance of their perplexity. 
 
The contradictory efects and di culties of What Will Be-
come of Me are many. The legalistic language of the nota-
rized form delects the intense sadness of the information 
in the irst statement. The restrained, minimal display of 
the work contrasts the biological artifacts presented. 
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experiences of What Will Become of Me could easily be 
overpowered by the strangeness of an artist donating 
her bodily remains to a museum, or repulsion at the 
sight of hair and ingernails in jars. Moreover, the work 
does not it neatly within narratives about Piper, best 
known for her performance actions from the 1970s that 
powerfully examine experiences of embodied alterity in 
public space with the aim of challenging and overcom-
ing xenophobia. Perhaps for these reasons, What Will 
Become of Me has not received signiicant scholarly treat-
ment to date .
 
This study ofers a context for, and analysis of, What 
Will Become of Me in terms of Piper’s broader career 
and her concept of “art as catalysis” (works that act as 
inducements for social change and reaction by present-
ing the artist’s body as an art object) (Piper 1996, 32), as 
well as the history of conceptualism to which Piper’s 
artwork belongs. One may fairly argue that the term 
“conceptualism” has been stretched to the point of 
now being inefectual and that arguing about whether 
or not an artwork or artist are conceptual is moot. Bor-
rowing from Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper’s 
arguments about the word “identity,” conceptualism 
has been strained simultaneously by its “strong” uses 
(those evoking a speciic form of philosophically-en-
gaged practice involving text, numbers and grids) and 
“weak” ones (those that atempt to expand “concep-
tualism” using this or that qualiier, while ultimately 
remaining beholden to its “strong” deinition) . In-
sofar as the term remains useful, it unites a variety of 
intellectual, experimental impulses in art making that 
can be irmly associated with a particular moment (the 
late 1960s and 1970s). It is in that sense, and for the rea-
son that Piper herself has identiied with the term, that 
it will be referred to in this paper. While early critics 
discussed conceptualism’s restrictive pursuit of objec-
tivity and anti-humanist deskilling, scholars have sub-
sequently understood conceptualism as also contain-
ing expansive and emotional aims. Here I argue that 
projects like What Will Become of Me show how concep-
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tualist methods may have been used to manage emo-
tionally fraught maters of life and death. In addition 
to Doyle, I will reference other theorists of afect in pro-
posing a new understanding of Piper’s work, including 
Ann Cvetkovich and her notion of an archive of feelings 
(Cvetkovich 2003). 
 
Before proceeding, I would like to briely acknowledge 
the ways that Piper herself can be a di cult subject, and 
why What Will Become of Me provides an important case 
study today. Recognized as one of the most signiicant 
artists of her generation, Piper has also at times been 
marginalized—a topic she has writen about at length 
and atributes directly to racism and sexism . In 2008, 
while a tenured professor of philosophy at Wellesley 
College, Piper was placed on a suspicious traveler list. 
She refused to return to the United States from Berlin 
as long as she was on the list, and her position at the 
college was terminated as a result. Piper does not grant 
interviews or public talks about her artwork (although 
she continues to publish and speak as an academic) . 
Her papers at the Archives of American Art are current-
ly closed.
In 2013, Piper requested that materials from her Mythic
Being performance series be removed from an NYU 
Grey Art Gallery exhibition titled Radical Presence: Black 
Performance in Contemporary Art. Piper wrote a leter to 
curator Valerie Cassel Oliver explaining that, while she 
appreciated Oliver’s intentions, a beter way to celebrate 
her art would have been to place it in a multi-ethnic ex-
hibition alongside a diversity of her peers (Cembalest 
2013). Because of these previous incidents and restric-
tions, writing on Piper can be intimidating. Standing in 
the presence of What Will Become of Me provides an odd 
feeling of closeness to the enigmatic Piper that the artist 
herself withholds.
••• 
Piper began practicing as a conceptualist in the late 
1960s while studying at the School of Visual Arts in New 
York. Her writings from that period convey a palpable 
sense of excitement regarding this development. Piper 
cites Sol LeWit as inluencing her belief in the primary 
importance of developing an art idea over the physi-
cal execution of an object . Her early conceptual proj-
ects involved explorations of time, space, and systems 
of representation—often exposing the contingency of 
human experience and knowledge. Piper describes her 
approach in a wordy leter to Terry Atkinson from 1969: 
“My present work is involved with using the boundaries 
of speciic elements of time and/or space as limitations 
on the ininite number of possible permutations of these 
elements, implied by the structure of the language used 
to identify them” (Piper 1996, 15).
Several of Piper’s early works followed a format of ver-
bally outlining the scope and intention of a project, then 
providing various forms of documentation and analy-
sis of the execution of that project as the inished piece. 
In Untitled (Elements: Wristwatch A, Wristwatch B) from 
1968, Piper drafts a plan for a work involving two wrist-
watches, each a diferent brand, to be synchronized at 
an arbitrary time and then rewound at twelve hour in-
tervals. The work would proceed until the watches had 
fallen out of sync by twelve hours. The project conforms 
to early New York conceptualist aesthetics in form and 
content. The proposal for the work is expressed in plain 
language on a typewriten sheet. On one level an ele-
mentary experiment, Untitled also has wider philosoph-
ical aspirations in demonstrating the organic impreci-
sion of mechanical timekeeping. 
I argue that one way to understand What Will Become of 
Me is to say that through it Piper came to terms with an 
emotionally trying period by processing the intensity 
of her feelings using the ostensibly rational matrix of a 
conceptual prompt. The results were  awkward and in-
complete. In the same manner that she discussed wrist-
watches in 1968, Piper enumerates the details of her ex-
periences in 1985, and articulates a course of action to 
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follow. She contrives a plan, with a speciic form and 
duration: to collect her hair, skin and ingernails until 
her death. Each time Piper ills a jar of hair and sends it 
to join the rest of the work, a measurement of her dis-
tance from the events of 1985 can be registered.
 
The words “plus my cremated ashes” are tagged onto 
Piper’s statement of intent in nonchalant fashion. The 
fact of death is thus reduced to another event in a se-
quence, while also understood as a certainty. The title 
of the work possibly references an eighteenth-century 
Methodist hymn by Charles Wesley, later transcribed as 
a popular shape note song titled “Idumea” by Ananias 
Davisson. The lyrics begin plaintively, questioningly, 
“And am I born to die? To lay this body down?” Several 
lines on, the phrase “What will become of me?” ap-
pears, usually writen with a question mark: “Soon as 
from earth I go What will become of me? Eternal happiness 
or woe must then my fortune be.” Piper noticeably drops 
the question mark, turning the words into an airmative 
statement; but as certain as the document looks and feels 
it does not seek to answer the unknowable questions 
that accompany maters of life and death.
 In contrast to Untitled, there is no immediately grasp-
able philosophical point or premise to the work. While 
the artist refers to the project as a “self-collection,” I 
would like to suggest that What Will Become of Me can 
also be considered an archive of feelings . In her epon-
ymous book, Ann Cvetkovich uses this phrase to dis-
cuss a variety of cultural texts that act as “repositories 
of feelings and emotions,” where feelings are not only 
visible or accessible in the content of the text, but also in 
the practices of its creation (Cvetkovich 2003, 7). Focus-
ing largely on queer public culture, Cvetkovich wants 
to view afect, and the afect associated with trauma, as 
the basis of public culture, thereby blurring the distinc-
tion between personal and public, emotional and politi-
cal . She deines trauma broadly, intentionally work-
ing against both its medicalization and the tendency to 
privilege large-scale public tragedy as the only kind of 
national trauma (diminishing the signiicance of indi-
vidual experiences). 
What Will Become of Me archives Piper’s life since 1985 in 
ways that are visible and invisible, spoken and unspo-
ken. From the time she started the work, although her 
body continued to change and age, its material traces 
were not only collected and archived in a single loca-
tion, but also cared for as an artwork. What Will Become 
of Me’s power derives in part from the fact that the items 
in the jars are witnesses to the events and changes that 
have shaped Piper’s personal life over the last thirty 
years, although the viewer’s relationship to these events 
and objects is inarticulate.
Although the look and scope of What Will Become of Me 
(if not the feelings it engenders) it within a trajectory 
of Piper’s early conceptualist prompts, it cannot be as 
easily incorporated within the practices that dominated 
Piper’s art in the intervening years between 1968 and 
1985. This period can be characterized by Piper’s idea 
of “art as catalysis” (Piper 1996, 32). According to Pip-
er, when her increasing awareness of the war in Vietnam 
and civil rights struggles at home caused her to question 
her early work’s tendency toward abstraction, she start-
ed doing performances on the street that aimed to serve 
as catalytic experiences for passersby. At the same time, 
she acknowledged with disappointment and frustration 
that many of the artists and curators who had seen and 
respected her earlier artworks exploring time, space and 
language had assumed from her name and practice that 
she was a white man. Piper found herself alienated and 
rejected by these individuals when they met her and saw 
that she was in fact a woman of colour .
In chemistry, a catalyst is a material agent that efects 
a reaction without being consumed or changed itself in 
the process. In Piper’s essay “Art as Catalysis,” she writes 
that in this form of artmaking, “The stronger the work, 
the stronger its impact and the more total (physiologi-
cal, psychological, intellectual, etc.) the reaction of the 
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viewer” (Piper 1996, 32). Piper posited that the greatest 
impact came from direct contact between people and 
initiated a series of performances in public. Summariz-
ing Piper’s shift to body-oriented art practices in a book 
about performance art and the politics of identity, Cher-
ise Smith writes, “If aspects of her visual appearance, 
physical embodiment, and lived experience as an art-
ist, woman, and black determined how she was treat-
ed, then she would make those identiications and the 
viewer’s perception of them her aesthetic and political 
focus” (Smith 2011, 40).
Piper initiated a series of performances with the name 
Catalysis in 1970 through 1971 in which she altered her 
appearance, making herself strange or even repugnant 
before engaging in everyday activities in New York that 
would allow her to be seen by and interact with large 
groups of people . In Catalysis III, for example, Piper 
coated her clothing in white house paint, wore a sign 
that read “Wet Paint” and then went shopping at Ma-
cy’s for gloves and sunglasses. existing simultaneous-
ly as another person on the street and an unannounced 
art object, Piper recorded the often hostile reactions of 
the people she encountered in text and image. In one 
photograph of the work, Piper’s expression appears 
resolutely blank, as she moves through a small group of 
women in front of a shoe store. All seven of the women 
in the photograph adjust their bodies to stare at Piper 
and appear to distance themselves from her.
In the 1970s and into the 1980s, Piper explicitly focused 
on challenging racial stereotypes as the change she want-
ed to efect. In her Mythic Being performance series, Pip-
er assumed the identity of a black, male alter ego  on the 
street and in a series of correspondent photo and text 
works. In an Afro wig, a moustache, jeans and a t-shirt, 
Piper performed activities such as going to openings, 
the movies, and the opera. She also photographed her-
self “cruising white women” and in a staged altercation 
with a white man. As with the Catalysis series, Mythic 
Being sought to test the reactions of a public in relation 
to Piper’s self-presentation—in this case as a igure that 
was feared and hated, while simultaneously associated 
with sexual prowess and cultural capital. 
The Mythic Being series also had an impact and purpose 
for Piper as a subject. As a result of the work, she expe-
rienced the freedoms associated with masculinity. She 
writes about enjoying spreading her legs and creating 
space for her body in public. She also encountered objec-
tiication as a visible minority male . Into the 1980s, 
Piper worked on multidisciplinary art projects high-
lighting her personal experiences of racism using illus-
tration, text, and photographs. Piper is light-skinned, 
and members of her father’s family have chosen to live 
as white (though her father refused). Growing up in 
Harlem, Piper recalls that black children assumed she 
was white and ridiculed her, and white adults either 
mocked and humiliated her as a racial other, or accused 
her of lying about her identity .
As her work changed radically in appearance, Piper 
continued to call herself a conceptualist. She wrote that, 
for her, conceptualism was an art form that subordinat-
ed the inished work to the initial idea, creating lexible 
formal parameters that could prevent her from being 
pigeonholed as an artist and allow her political content 
to dominate (Piper 1996, 249). Nonetheless, Piper has 
often been pigeonholed. Since much of her art starting 
in the 1970s focuses on race, and since she herself is a 
person of colour, her works are sometimes reductively 
interpreted as diaristic and only readable in the context 
of a discussion of herself or her identity. The MoMA’s 
explanation of What Will Become of Me on its website 
echoes this simpliication: “As both an African Ameri-
can and a woman---two groups that have traditionally 
been marginalized in the history of art---she is literally 
inserting herself into the Museum’s collection” (MoMA 
Learning). The museum assumes that Piper’s actions as 
an artist stem exclusively from her race and sex, and 
that the work’s value paradoxically relies on the muse-
um’s own historical prejudices. Although there may be 
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validity to the idea of Piper’s inserting herself into the 
collection, What Will Become of Me is far more complex 
and wide-reaching than MoMA’s statement allows for.  
What Will Become of Me appears to be a return to Piper’s 
earlier, textual conceptualist forms, carrying with it ideas 
about turning her body into an object from her “art as 
catalysis” performances. The work’s relationship to 
its viewer is therefore opaque, especially when posed 
against Piper’s catalytic performances, but its status as 
art can be productively discussed in relationship to oth-
er artists similarly employing elements of classic con-
ceptualism: data, grids and writen prompts resembling 
thought experiments, to occupy a space between art and 
life with sometimes unwieldy results.
•••
In 1989, Benjamin Buchloh published his essay “From 
the Aesthetic of Administration to Institutional Critique 
(Some aspects of Conceptual Art 1962-1969).” The essay 
framed American conceptualism with the supposition 
that economic systems determine the scope of all cul-
tural production made within that system. According to 
Buchloh’s case study, when American society began to 
increasingly emphasize white-collar labor, moving sites 
of manufacture out of urban centers, artists responded 
using administrative methodologies. Artists performed 
research, analyzed data, and created paperwork. Bu-
chloh ultimately dismissed the rhetoric of conceptualism 
as self-righteous, claiming that its deining features were 
a conined scope and lack of vision (Buchloh 1989, 53).  
Buchloh’s assessment begged revision, particularly as 
the legacy of early conceptual experiments continued to 
inform art practices into the 1990s and 2000s. More re-
cent eforts to develop art history’s treatment of concep-
tualism include Peter eleey’s 2009 exhibition The Quick 
and the Dead, which included both What Will Become 
of Me and Untitled (Elements: Wristwatch A, Wristwatch 
B). In his catalogue essay, eleey poses the question: 
“What is alive and what is dead within the legacy of 
certain conceptual forms and strategies?” (eleey 2009, 
33). Rather than unduly restrained, eleey’s conceptu-
alism is wide reaching: a means to enact and interact 
with life’s greatest unknowns, including death. If con-
ceptualism fails, it is because of the impossibility of its 
self-assigned task.
Another text, Eve Melzer’s 2013 book Systems We Have 
Loved: Conceptual Art, Afect, and the Antihumanist Turn 
pairs conceptualism with structuralism to consider the 
ways that artists, critics and theorists came to terms 
with the human subject in the late twentieth-century. 
Discussing the dominant compositional form of the 
grid within conceptualism (one that Piper took on in 
her early project Here and Now (1968)) Melzter writes, 
“[W]e have come to love the idea of the grid. Its lawful 
scientism, abstraction, and cerebralism are themselves 
afective, even as---in fact, precisely because---they en-
deavor to keep the imaginary and with it the afective 
at bay. Structuralism had seduced us, symptomatized 
through us, and gripped us with its promise of a master-
ful dis-afection” [Emphasis in original] (Melzer 2013, 
66). I argue that, regardless of intention, in her gesture, 
Piper participated in a form of conceptualism that uses 
the “lawful scientism, abstraction, and cerebralism” of 
the grid, or the contract, in order to manage life—in the 
sense of regulating, controlling and testing it.  Artists 
working in a similar tradition include Japanese Amer-
ican artist On Kawara and American conceptualist Lee 
Lozano. These two artists in particular serve to eluci-
date what I would like to claim is a shared tradition 
of Piper’s practice, for the fact that both Kawara and 
Lozano’s art engaged in projects of extensive duration 
that directly involve the content and activity of every-
day life such as to become, at times, indistinguishable 
from it.
 
On Kawara’s career was dominated by a series of de-
cades-long projects that chronicled his days and travels 
. In the TODAY series, Kawara hand-painted small 
canvases, with each day’s date marked in a neat, uni-
form script, from the mid-1960s until the end of his 
life in 2013. He destroyed any paintings that were not 
started and completed on the same day. As with Piper’s 
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reticent archive of bodily remnants, most details of 
Kawara’s life were left out of the paintings, although 
the date was always recorded in the standard format of 
his current country of residence and subtitled with im-
portant world events that occurred on that day. 
In I Am Still Alive (1970 – 2000) Kawara sent nearly 900 
telegrams to friends, artists and collectors reading sim-
ply, “I am still alive.” Piper’s What Will Become of Me 
similarly declares her continued existence each time she 
adds materials to the collection, while excluding infor-
mation about how states of existence or being change. 
Kawara’s projects, which include books containing lists 
of all the people he met everyday for over a decade, or 
all the places he visited marked on maps, share a data- 
driven, informative simplicity with certain of Piper’s 
projects. However, the lengths to which Kawara went to 
document his life, using tightly moderated means to de-
velop a compendium of hundreds of books, containing 
largely impersonal information, are undoubtedly pecu-
liar. Their motivation, if not their appearance, is equally 
inscrutable and messy as Piper’s and, I contend, equally 
an archive of feelings. 
   
In the late 1960s, Lee Lozano’s artwork turned to a series 
of what she called “Life-Art” projects that merged strate-
gies of conceptual art, journaling, and performance . 
In her Dialogue Piece (1969) the artist challenged herself 
to call, write and speak to people, both acquaintances 
and strangers, in order to have dialogues with them. 
The documentation for the work includes the names of 
the individuals she spoke to (many of them well known 
artists) and the method of contact, but not the content 
of the conversations. Lozano’s strategy of withholding 
this content enacts a conceptualist trope, shared with 
Piper and Kawara, of telling rather than showing. In her 
Grass Piece and No Grass Piece from the same year, Loza-
no smoked pot all day every day for thirty-three days, 
recording the results, and then tried to abstain from 
smoking pot for the same number of days (less success-
fully). Her most puzzling and most diicult (referencing 
Doyle) work is Dropout Piece, which involved the art-
ist slowly abandoning the oicial art world, claiming 
to no longer produce work or atend art world events, 
and eventually seeming to give up her artistic identity 
altogether, leaving New York for her parents’ house in 
Dallas . 
Piper, Kawara, and Lozano used conceptualist strate-
gies of text-based, experimental practice to order daily, 
lived experience across decades. Piper’s What Will Be-
come of Me manages, in the sense of making manageable, 
a close encounter with death and loss by adhering the 
artist to a practice of self-collection, and subsequently 
self-preservation. On Kawara performed longstanding 
rituals, appearing to equate life largely with the passage 
of events in calendrical time. In contrast to Kawara and 
Piper, Lozano’s works do not share the look of rigid or-
der. Lozano favored hand-drawn lists and declarations. 
Nonetheless, the artist atempted to mediate the passing 
of time by creating prompts for artworks that were large-
ly indistinguishable from actions of everyday life, and 
experimented with personal and social limits. Such com-
parisons enrich all three artists’ practices, which might 
initially appear obtusely idiosyncratic, but point to a 
larger strategy for iguring out how to exist in the world 
as a person and an artist . 
•••
Returning briely to the issue of “catalysis,” what type 
of reaction or catalytic potential exists in What Will 
Become of Me? It fosters sympathy for and connection 
with Piper, though in a way that also keeps the viewer 
at a distance. The work challenges the viewer to create 
equivalence between the artist (invoked as “Me” in the 
title) and her body, though in contrast to the Catalysis 
performances, Mythic Being and later projects, it is not 
immediately apparent to a viewer that Piper is a wom-
an, or a woman of colour. 
There is also an element of institutional critique in the 
work, targeting the staf of the MoMA who will become 
Piper’s eventual caregivers and memorializers, taking 
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on responsibilities usually reserved for a partner or 
family member. Artists have long regarded MoMA 
as the unavoidable, yet perhaps unwanted, arbiter of 
the oicial history of modern art. Many protests and 
happenings have been staged there aimed at ofending 
the museum’s sensibilities and creating a space for ex-
perimental and political practice inside its walls. Given 
such a history, Piper’s choice of the Museum of Modern 
Art (an institution that owned no artworks by Piper in 
1985) might be read as deliberate agitation. However, 
as with Mythic Being, to see Piper as only acting accord-
ing to one strategy—an outward and political one—is 
to ignore the ways that her work continued to serve 
other purposes.
•••
In Boris Groys’ essay, “On the Curatorship” he writes 
that only artists have the special ability to decide what 
is art and what can be displayed in exhibition spaces 
as such (Groys 2008, 45-52). He claims this represents 
a paradigm shift from when the curator alone held 
that privilege. In the past, for example, curators took 
functional, often religious objects and put them on 
display in museums, an iconoclastic gesture that pro-
faned the sacred. To take Groys’ at his word, now the 
artist has the ability to elevate the mundane into art, 
and in Piper’s case even to re-inscribe the gesture of 
the curator by turning her own remains into relics 
for museum display. In What Will Become of Me, Piper 
assumes the power to dictate that her ashes will be 
placed in a museum as a work of art.
 
Churches once engaged in a perverse form of competi-
tion, exhuming the bodies of saints in order to display 
them. Objects of religious veneration, relics and reli-
quaries were also economic boosts for a church and its 
town. If artists can be called modern-day saints in the 
secular religion of art, museums arguably engage in a 
similar practice surrounding the accumulation of art 
objects touched by artists, connecting the institution to 
the presence of these individuals whose lives are ideal-
ized through these objects and canonized through their 
presence in the museum. exploiting these co-produc-
tive dynamics, Piper has assured herself a permanent 
place in the museum where she will continue to be con-
sidered and cared for as a person and an art object. 
However, What Will Become of Me will also occupy the 
museum as a diicult work, a powerful, afective ar-
chive, and a testament to a conceptualist, but moreover 
human, desire to manage life and death.
14
DEIRDRE SMITH
is a doctoral student at the University of Texas 
at Austin. Her research interests include the his-
tory and historiography of conceptual art, labor 
critique, and the history of the role of the artist in 
society. Her dissertation focuses on the context 
of socialist Zagreb in the 1970s and the work of 
Mladen Stilinović and Goran Trbuljak. She holds 
an MA from George Washington University 
where her research focused on Sol LeWit’s wall 
drawings and the work of his assistants. 
WORKS CITED
Buchloh, Benjamin. “From the Aesthetic of Administration to 
Institutional Critique (Some aspects of Conceptual Art 1962-
1969),” in L’Art Conceptual, Une Perspective, ed. Suzanne Pagé. 
(Paris: Musée d’Art de la Ville de Paris), 41-53.
Cvetkovich, Ann. Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Les-
bian Public Culture. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003.
Cembalest, Robin. “Adrian Piper Pulls Out of Black Perfor-
mance-Art Show.” Artnews.com. October 25, 2013, accessed on 
December 15, 2015. htp://www.artnews.com/2013/10/25/piper-
pulls-out-of-black-performance-art-show/
 
Doyle, Jennifer. Hold it Against Me: Diiculty and Emotion in Con-
temporary Art. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013.
eleey, Peter. The Quick and the Dead. Minneapolis: Walker Art 
Center, 2009.
Groys, Boris. Art Power. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008.
Melzer, Eve. Systems We Have Loved: Conceptual Art, Afect, and 
the Antihumanist Turn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2013.
Piper, Adrian. Out of Order, Out of Sight, Volume I: Selected Writ-
ings in Meta-Art 1968-1992, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996.
Smith, Cherise. Enacting Others: Politics of Identity in Eleanor An-
tin, Nikki S. Lee, Adrian Piper, and Anna Deavere Smith. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2011.
“What Will Become of Me.” MoMA Learning, accessed on De-
cember 15, 2015. htps://www.moma.org/learn/moma_learning/
adrian-piper-what-will-become-of-me-1985-ongoing
15
Through slow-morphing animated portrait pho-
tographs, Anthony Cerniello’s animation Danielle 
makes visible facial transformations, showing a 
young child becoming an old woman. Created 
from a series of photographs of an extended fam-
ily, Danielle oscillates between a ictitious and real 
subject. While the actual subject of Danielle exists 
within the derivatively named work, the trajectory 
of this subject is manufactured through digital ma-
nipulation. The animation engages representations 
of the transforming female face as well as the efect 
of this imagery on subjectivity, both for the sub-
ject of the video and the viewer. Though the way 
in which the face transforms can be interpreted as 
the process of aging —generating an anxious, af-
fective response—this paper atempts to consider 
the moving-image work primarily through a lens 
of transformation and becoming.
Through an investigation of surveillance, facial rec-
ognition and identiication, this essay also explores 
the cultural phenomenon of biometrics through 
the lens of contemporary portraiture. I intend to 
examine the ways in which the face is being coded 
for surveying, classifying, and categorizing infor-
mation about the private person, and to highlight 
new methods of resisting or questioning biometric 
control. In taking up Cerniello’s Danielle, this paper 
not only questions subjectivity and representations 
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of the face within the animated work, but also the 
efect of multiple subjects merging/morphing to 
create the illusion of a singular, transforming en-
tity. In what ways does this work undermine and 
complicate technologically driven modes of recog-
nition and identiication?  
FINDING DANIELLE
Danielle (2013) is a ive-minute, single channel, digi-
tally enhanced video animation by commercial and 
ilm editor Anthony Cerniello. The video was pro-
duced in collaboration with artists Keith Sirchio, 
Nathan Meier, edmund earle and George Cuddy. 
While Danielle has been widely circulated across 
the internet, I irst viewed the animation in Bio-
metric—an exhibition at the New Media Gallery 
(New Westminster, BC) that explored the meeting 
point between portraiture and biometric-centered 
science and technologies.
I stood close and watched Danielle. The animation 
begins with almost imperceptible transformations, 
producing an uncanny sensation. The irst few 
viewings, my eyes were ixed on the screen in an ef-
fort to witness the moments of distinct change from 
child to young girl to young woman to matriarch. 
The illusion of liveness—as opposed to a static pho-
tographic representation—is achieved through the 
subtle movements of the facial features. The mouth 
quivers as though to speak; the eyes blink, gazing 
back; cheeks luter, eyebrows perk, chins tremble 
and throats swallow. I left with the desire to know 
how this subject—the animated Danielle—could 
possibly exist. 
 
In the fall of 2012, Cerniello atended Danielle’s 
family reunion with photographer Keith Sirchio. 
Using a Hasselblad medium format camera, Sirchio 
photographed members of Danielle’s family, from 
her youngest cousins to her oldest relatives (Jobson 
2013). The photographs were scanned and edited to 
include only those family members with recogniz-
ably similar facial structure and features, then ani-
mated by Meier and Earle using After Efects and 3D Studio Max. 
In order to bring the still photographs back to life and generate the 
illusion of a singular subject captured in a time lapse video, Cuddy 
used the 3D visual efects software Nuke to include details such as 
blinking eyes to the animation (Jobson 2013). Cerniello described 
Danielle as the product of a desire to “make a person,” to fabricate a 
narrative using the body’s trajectory from young to old . In this 
way, Danielle can be understood as a construct, a person that both 
does and does not exist within the animation.
 
When viewed as a series of screenshots, Danielle’s transforma-
tions are more apparent as the subject appears to grow, taking up 
more space on the screen. The screenshots also reveal the original 
‘snapshot’ structure of the work and expose greater diferences be-
tween subjects later over-coded by the animation. The transforma-
tion produced by the morphing face(s) echoes long-term portrait 
projects such as Noah Kalina’s Everyday (2000-2012), which con-
igured twelve years of self-portraits into an eight-minute video 
composite—or Diego Goldberg’s The Arrow of Time (1976-2014) 
that documents annually each member of his family in an ongo-
ing ritual. These works engage with aging by documenting and 
recording slight changes that accumulate over the years, requiring 
the passage of real time for their fulillment. Danielle, by contrast, 
artiicially produces the passage of time, merging multiple individ-
ual subjects (the various family members) into an animation that 
leads the viewer to believe they are witnessing a time-lapse video.
 
In cinematic terms, the reproduction of movement functions as a 
selection of equidistant instants to create an impression of conti-
nuity. Taking up Henri Bergson’s second thesis of movement – the 
any-instant-whatever– Gilles Deleuze frames the lineage of cinema 
with the snapshot that gets transformed by the sequential organi-
zation of a whole (Deleuze 1986, 4). He references eadweard Muy-
bridge’s galloping horse (Deleuze 1986, 5) as an example, which 
allows the viewer to witness singular points of movement, not dis-
similar to the original snapshots of Danielle and the screenshots in-
cluded here. Deleuze notes that the any-instant-whatever holds the 
potential to generate a new awareness of cinema as “the organ for 
perfecting the new reality” (Deleuze 1986, 8). In the case of Cerni-
ello’s video, the creation of a new reality includes the creation of 
a new subject—Danielle—who exists only within the animation. 
In this way, Danielle can be interpreted as side-stepping the tem-
porally-based dialogue of aging, engaging instead a discourse of 
transformation and becoming that supports a decidedly less anx-
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ious and more unexpected viewing experience. 
This afective dimension of Danielle can perhaps be 
atributed to the spectacle of technology—the use 
of compositing software to create the illusion of a 
singular subject—or by contrast, the recognition of 
the various subjects that have been merged togeth-
er through visual similarities.
 
In its production, Danielle combines scanning, 
modeling and rendering, compositing and VFX 
software. Following the advancements of digi-
tal media and open-source software, the creation, 
distribution and modifying of software in the 21st 
Century engenders social activity. In his seminal 
1989 essay “An Aesthetics of Astonishment: early 
Cinema and the (In)Credulous Spectator,” cinema 
and media scholar Tom Gunning describes the irst 
experiences of moving-image media, which terri-
ied audiences by its uncanny realism. According 
to Gunning, this legendary response demonstrates 
the illusory power of cinema, seting in motion the 
theories of spectatorship that would come to dom-
inate ilm studies (Gunning 2004, 57). Approaching 
the spectator from a historical perspective, Gunning 
investigates the atraction of new inventions and 
the role of illusion in cinematic experience, consid-
ering the impact of projected movement and visual 
transformation from the trompe l’oeil genre to the 
uncanny qualities of recording the real. Following 
Gunning, early ilms express the public’s interest in 
atractions through the excitement of technological 
curiosities, the exaggeration of experience, and the 
highlighting of display (Gunning 2004, 57). Though 
the illusion of cinema was and continues to be suc-
cessful, it is nonetheless understood as illusion. In 
this way the spectator, not duped into believing 
that what they are seeing is ‘real,’ is nevertheless 
atracted to the spectacle of the experience. From 
this perspective, Danielle takes up Gunning’s cine-
ma of atractions in its use of new technologies and 
software to create an illusory narrative of a singu-
lar aging subject. 
SEEING FACES
The contemporary spectator continues to be swayed by distracting 
spectacles. Though aware of the illusions made possible by tech-
nology, Danielle engages the viewer in the spectacle of seamless, 
surreal transformation. In observing Danielle closely, it becomes 
apparent that the question posed by the work is not what we see 
but rather who. Is it the willing suspension of disbelief that sim-
ulates the experience of encountering a single subject, or is there 
another device to decipher? If there is another device efecting our 
perception of Danielle, it must be an interpretive one.
 
The face is historically our most identiiable atribute as individu-
als. Until recently, the human capacity to recognize faces has been 
unmatched, but this changed with the growing market of surveil-
lance software. Beyond the portrait as art object, images of the face 
have long been integral to self-identity formation, social documen-
tation, and identiication management. Identity can be understood 
as a series of qualities – physical, psychological or social – that as-
sist in establishing a consistent presentation of personality. Sub-
jectivity, in contrast, refers to the ways in which one’s identity or 
personality is constantly relected, examined, tested and under-
stood by one’s self (Hall 2004, 3-4). As Arthur Kleinman and erin 
Fiz-Henry describe, subjectivity should not be limited to biologi-
cal reductionism (physical features), but must also acknowledge 
“the variability, heterogeneity, and contingency of our subjectivi-
ties as they unfold within the realm of experience” (Kleinman and 
Fiz-Henry 2007, 53). In this way, subjectivity atempts to locate the 
site from which identity develops – whether through appearance, 
social standing, historical and cultural contexts, race or gender – 
and how, if at all, one might exercise control over it. Subjectivity 
therefore considers the ‘legibility’ of identity, and must be con-
tinuously renegotiated to deine and locate the self. This is even 
more the case when images of the face are produced/reproduced, 
presented/represented through technologies of seeing, especially 
within biometrics discourse. Ultimately, representations of face, 
whether sculptural, photographic or algorithmic, signal identity. 
We analyse facial expressions and facial features and make deter-
minations about identity, character, and intention. But what of the 
veracity of the face? What can be determined as ‘truth’ in the face?
evolving out of a long history of documenting and analyzing the 
face as a visible representation of a person’s inner character and 
personality, biometric techniques draw from scientiic methods to 
claim that the face, isolated from the body, can give away the truth. 
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By deinition, biometrics is the measurement and 
documentation of various sites of the body, includ-
ing the face. Implicated in these modes of classii-
cation is the use of photography as a scientiic tool 
to record and visualize facial features and their 
underlying meaning. The allure of photography in 
the 19th century was in its supposed ability to ob-
jectively capture and neatly frame a rapidly chang-
ing world (Hamilton 2001, 57). The simultaneous 
development of photographic technologies in the 
mid-1820s and early biometrics in the mid-1850s 
demonstrates the relationship of picture-taking to 
evidence-gathering within an era “obsessed with 
taxonomy and social order” (Hamilton 2001, 57). 
The continuing desire to identify and organize the 
subject within a social order has culminated in the 
current, ubiquitous culture of surveillance.  
As cultural theorist Btihja Ajana notes, the seduc-
tiveness of the ‘new’ and the novelty of contempo-
rary biometric technologies often overshadow its 
long history. As such, a culture that greatly values 
newness “conceals the genealogy of new technol-
ogies and obscures the historical continuity con-
necting them to older technologies” (Ajana 2013, 
25). The measurement of the body for purposes of 
identiication was primarily implemented to docu-
ment subjects and identities perceived as marginal 
or criminal. Similarly, measurements of features 
were thought to provide insight into the character 
and intelligence of a person and ofer ‘truth’ where 
otherwise it might be concealed. These techniques 
only reinforce assumptions about visibility, gen-
der, race and class, as well as modes of inclusion 
or exclusion; both historical and contemporary 
modes of identiication have been “conceived of in 
terms of dichotomies of self and other, of inside 
and outside, of belonging and alien and so on” 
(Ajana 2013, 26). Similarly, biometrics infer that 
the human body (speciically the face, in this case 
study) is stable and unchanging.
The reinvigoration of biometrics, when coupled 
with digital technologies and complex algorithms 
of identiication, suggests a remediation of early techniques. Each 
of these historical methods are genealogically linked to the cur-
rent modes of measuring, categorizing and ‘datafying’ the body. 
As such, contemporary iterations can be considered to improve 
upon early modes of measurement and identiication. Borrowing 
from Bolter and Grusin’s concept of remediation, current biometric 
technologies can be understood “as hybrids of technical, material, 
social, and economic factors,” (Bolter and Grusin 1998, 77) com-
bining and adapting previous techniques to become beter at the 
task of identifying individuals using bodily markers. Anthropo-
metrics, physiognomy, composite photography and eugenics are 
just some of the historical examples of discrimination via scientiic 
study of the face. But biometrics also points to the hybridization 
of the body and technology. In Governing through Biometrics, Ajana 
compares the remediation of biometric techniques to the presenta-
tion of a new media or ‘biomedia’ that converts the body into data 
and codes (Ajana 2013, 21). As such, biometrics escapes the famil-
iar McLuhanesque trope of technology as an extension of man, be-
coming instead a rendition of the body (Ajana 2013, 21).
The normalizing of surveillance and tracking systems, from tailored 
advertisements to facial recognition in social media photo-tagging, 
demonstrates the social acceptance of the digitized face as an ac-
curate representation of identity and subjectivity. Cultural theorist 
Karyl Ketchum describes how the contemporary cultural under-
standing of the body, engrossed in the oscillating qualities of seen 
and unseen, and the ‘terror’ of the unknown, “naturaliz[es] associ-
ations between certain bodies and certain discourses, certain ways 
of looking and certain ways of being seen” (Ketchum 2009, 198). 
What remains problematic is that these associations – through sta-
tistics, algorithms, and templates – are deined within a threshold, 
mobilizing “a discourse claiming an ability to quantify, calculate, 
and organize—or master – the surfaces of the body […]” (Ketchum 
2009, 196). This recalls, among other points, the popularity and 
persistence of physiognomic facial registers as a means of divining 
truth at a glance. 
As a portrait (of a person ‘made’ by Cerniello), Danielle engages 
long-standing questions of subjectivity and representation, taking 
the viewer to the edge of recognition, identiication, and the digi-
tally manufactured subject. From this position, who am I as a sub-
ject and who is Danielle? Danielle complicates the traditional por-
trait-based representation of an individual existence, highlighting 
the way in which we adapt, transform, and become throughout 
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a life. The drive to ‘know’ faces through biometric 
qualiications raises questions about whether tech-
nology can identify faces with the same accuracy as 
humans, and addresses ways of seeing shaped by 
social, cultural, and historical forces. As a result of 
the rising culture of surveillance, various sites of 
our bodies have become commoditized, denying 
multiplicity even where it often exists. In this way, 
facial biometrics and recognition technology treat 
the face as a static representation of identity. Dan-
ielle generates a luid body that points to the vari-
ability of a perceived singular identity, and in doing 
so questions the potential for positive (ie: correct) 
biometric identiication. With so many faces, then, 
which one is the ‘real’ Danielle? Is there a Danielle? 
To work through the multiple facial layers within 
the work, this paper will take up three potentialities 
within Deleuzian analyses of the face: the qualities 
of Peircean irstness and secondness; the whole sub-
ject who is elsewhere, forming a ceaseless becoming; 
and the immanence of a life that exists as multiple 
virtual subjectivities.  
CLOSE-UP
Watching the animation, it is challenging—if not im-
possible—to tell where one subject ends and anoth-
er begins. The subtlety of the transformations and 
the micro-movements of the eyes, mouth, cheeks 
and chin create the impression of a living, becoming 
entity. In the sixth chapter of Cinema 1: The Move-
ment-Image Deleuze considers the close-up in cine-
ma, describing the oscillation between the relective 
and intensive face. In comparing qualities, Deleuze 
draws on the dual possibility of the face represented 
as either a uniied surface or expressions the surface 
(as a collection of independent micro-movements) 
(Deleuze 1986, 88). With the close-up face, typical 
capacities to express, socialize, identify, and com-
municate dissolve. The face becomes immobilized 
yet animated with potentialities, and can point to 
new connections or assemblages that might bring to 
life previously unknown representations of the face 
and subject (Herzog 2008, 66).
In the case of Danielle, the changing face of the single, manufactured 
subject can be understood as an intensive face, transforming over 
time with micro facial expressions and movements. This becomes 
the representation of a subject, brought to life through animation 
and special efects—the constructed subject that does not exist out-
side the cinematic space. Alternatively, if the work is considered 
to comprise multiple subjectivities, the intensive face(s) could be 
understood as contained within the outline of the relective face, a 
placeholder in which the face of Danielle might (at one unknown 
moment) appear like a phantom .
In describing the face as afection-image, Deleuze takes up semioti-
cian Charles S. Peirce’s classiication of images and signs into “irst-
ness” and “secondness” (Deleuze 1986, 98). The afection-image is 
categorized as ‘irstness,’ relating to possibility prior to actualiza-
tion, sensation, and feeling: “It gives a proper consistency to the 
possible, it expresses the possible without actualising it” (Deleuze 
1986, 98). Secondness, on the other hand, is the actualized ‘real,’ a 
closing down of possibility into one outcome. Danielle operates in 
the scope of ‘irstness,’ if we take into consideration the variability 
and changing surface of the face, as well as the space each subject 
takes up within the perceived whole. According to Peirce, irstness 
“[…] is that rare faculty […] of seeing what stares one in the face 
[…] unreplaced by any interpretation” (Peirce 1998, 147). The im-
possibility of deciphering where one subject ends and another be-
gins lends Danielle the impression of always-becoming that seems 
to align with the Deleuzian interpretation of irstness. 
ONE OR THE OTHER PERSON
The oscillation between self and other, Danielle and viewer, gener-
ates an experience of the face as a potential encounter with some-
thing unrecognizable. In their essay “Losing Face,” english and 
literary scholar Dr. Gregory Flaxman, with ilm and literary the-
orist Dr. elena Oxman, explore the various recurrent concepts of 
the face put forward by Deleuze and Guatari. The potential of the 
indistinguishable face leads to its disappearance, “[becoming] the 
non-place of an encounter between the subject and an asubjective 
becoming, between faciality and its efacement, between thinking 
and an unthought” (Flaxman and Oxman 2008, 40). The most sa-
lient aspect of Flaxman and Oxman’s essay is the discussion of the 
“Other Person,” which designates only one among multiple po-
sitions that can generate a plurality of subjects (Flaxman and Ox-
man 2008, 41). From this position Deleuze and Guatari question 
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to what extent an Other Person is actually other. 
According to Flaxman and Oxman, “this ield of 
indeterminacy already suggests the contours of 
another problem […]: what if instead of asking 
which comes irst, self or other person, we inquire 
into the nature of the positions that deine self and 
Other Person, or even subject and object?” (Flax-
man and Oxman 2008, 41) Determining in this way 
that the Other Person has the potential to occupy 
a plurality of positions, Deleuze and Guatari note 
that “the Other Person appears […] as something 
that is very diferent: a possible world, the possi-
bility of a frightening world. This possible world 
is not real, or not yet, but it exists nonetheless.” 
 As it relates to animation, the expression of the 
Other Person exists within the reality created by 
the moving-image illusion. Danielle, having multi-
ple subjects, could be explored through this theo-
retical position, challenging the singularity of the 
other in relation to the viewer who observes Dan-
ielle. The ‘no one’ that appears in Danielle points 
to an unfamiliar, even frightening world in which 
transformations take place at a rapid pace, never 
allowing one possibility to take priority over any 
other. At the same time, the multiple potentialities 
presented in the face(s) of Danielle signal endless 
possibilities—the many positions from which we 
might experience life, self, becoming, other. each/
all can perhaps be understood as virtual subjects 
engaged in a process of actualization within the 
animation.
The potentialities, subjectivities and transforma-
tions within Danielle all contribute to the illusion 
of liveness and movement that make the anima-
tion appear real. Borrowing from Bergson’s third 
thesis of movement, Danielle holds the capacity to 
express change of duration or the whole (Deleuze 
1986, 8). The ‘whole’ according to Deleuze is de-
ined by relations that are external to it and in a 
state of ceaseless becoming: “Through movement 
the whole is divided up into objects, and objects 
are re-united in the whole, and indeed between 
the two ‘the whole’ changes” (Deleuze 1986, 11). 
Danielle forms a ceaseless becoming, a constant transformation of 
one family member’s photographic image into another, each relat-
ing to all the rest, whether sequentially or otherwise. The ‘whole’ 
that is elsewhere is a ictitious subject that has the potential to be-
come any number of other subjects, and might even point to life 
itself, which passes over the individual faces while exceeding them 
(Marks 2015). The complexity of Danielle stems from the inability to 
decide between the hegemony of the singular fabricated Danielle, 
or the between-moments that contain multiple potential Danielles 
(Deleuze and Boyman 2001, 30-31).
CONCLUSION
The many faces of Danielle remain full of possibilities—for analysis, 
exploration, interpretation and identiication. Initially captivated by 
the visualization of aging that overshadows Danielle, it has been my 
goal to allow room for the implicated subjects to come into view, 
adapt and transform, mimicking the process of becoming that I ar-
gue is inherent to understanding the animated work. Danielle calls 
upon the viewer to come face-to-face with the illusion of a rapid-
ly changing subjectivity, an experience not unlike the surging low 
of time and the transformation of life itself. A genealogical experi-
ment, Danielle has the potential to become any number of subjects, 
and from this position replaces the anxious discourse of aging with 
possibilities for personal growth, or metamorphosis.
 
Aided by the slight movements and shifts in the faces themselves, 
the uncanny quality of liveness created by the animation eclipses 
its iction. This new subject can only exist within the space of the 
digitally manufactured portrait, questioning representations of the 
face, the veracity of identiication, and the visual deception of ani-
mation. From the multiple individuals photographed to the single 
life of Danielle, the close-up face(s) slip in and out of potentialities. 
One moment a surface waiting to carry an expression, the next a 
whole subject with the possibility to change into any other. Who 
might Danielle become next?
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I’ve wrestled with the decision to write about 
interpreting a 2007 work by Ken Lum, House 
of Realization. I’ve wrestled with it because 
it’s a work I’ve felt manipulated by. It’s a 
work whose procession is rote and predeter-
mined— something I generally feel cornered 
by, as if the work is speaking down to me. 
But I believe that this manipulation ofers a 
tidy illustration of the way the interpretative 
impulse can drive an interaction with an art-
work. House of Realization is indeed tidier and 
more compelling than any other, subtler work 
I know.
The work begins with a long strip of text along 
the wall, an excerpt from a poem also titled 
House of Realization by 13-14th century Sui 
mystic poet Yunus emre. Trying to remember 
this text, before Googling it furiously upon be-
ginning to write about the work, I thought of 
it as a platitude—the poem’s content seemed 
completely insigniicant to me at the time. It 
could have been virtually any text with an air 
of light profoundness to it. Here’s where the 
manipulation begins: Lum presents us a text 
to read and interpret, and that’s what – under 
the pressure of being funnelled into a serious 
corridor in an art museum—we do.
The text excerpt, presented in reverse, is set 
across from a mirror. Reading the vinyl alone 
is di cult, but reading it in the wall-sized 
mirror is quite a bit easier—stepping back 
and forward so as not to get one’s relected 
body in the way of the text. 
Turning the corner at the end of the corridor, 
spectators enter a second, darker room, where 
the mirror’s glass is revealed to be two-way. 
I remember laughing nervously at this point, 
looking at the strangers in the room who had 
just watched me read the text, smiling a bit 
abashed, and then standing against the back 
wall to observe. More than curiosity, I felt 
compelled to watch the next readers, to—
what? Regain my composure? Avenge myself 
for being caught in the interpretive act by im-
posing the same surveillance on others?
I would say my reaction to the two-way mir-
ror was typical, although I have only the 
strangers’ outward expressions to judge by. 
One man entered and angrily faced his sur-
veillors in the small dark room (“You mean 
you guys have been watching me this whole 
time? That’s fucked up”) before storming out. 
We watched him pass through the other side 
of the glass and give us all the inger. This 
man was caught looking at art and trying to 
understand it in public, and it made him mad. 
In so many deep ways, this feels indicative of 
what’s at the sopping core of interpretation: it 
is vulnerable and it risks revealing something 
of us, without our intending to.
And Lum cannily predicts that we’ll be moved 
to interpret, to ind out if we “got it right” by 
turning the corner into the dark room. Interpre-
tation engineers a kind of participatory churn-
ing in House of Realization. Because the work 
begs so obscenely to be interpreted (and uses 
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interpretation as a mechanic of manipulation) 
I can’t help feeling proud of the spectator that 
fails to even try to interpret—the one who 
picks her nose, pops a zit, checks her lipstick, 
adjusts her belt in the mirror. And may she be 
unlinching once she gets to the other side of 
the glass!
Returning to this work, I’m painfully aware 
of how cynically I’ve disregarded the text— 
that it might be meaningful (imagine seeing 
the poem really resonate with someone from 
across a two-way mirror) or even beloved (the 
work was irst shown at the Istanbul biennial, 
where Yunus emre is recognized as a historical 
cultural igure). 
But if I didn’t think the text was so inconse-
quential, I probably wouldn’t think this work 
was so successful. I still feel it could be any 
text—that somehow making meaning from 
the words on the wall is less important than 
making meaning from surveilling others’ 
meaning-making. House of Realization con-
jures something of what interpretation always 
does— it sits on our subjectivity, like an anvil 
on a ribcage. This anvil has been on my ribcage 
this whole time? That’s fucked up.
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